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MCCORMICK*

1. Basis of compensation in tort and contract cases. Occasionally in tort cases, an award by way of punishment may be
made, but normally in all cases the truism remains true, that the
primary aim in measuring damages is to arrive at compensation,
no more and no less.2 In a case of tort-the breach of some duty
which the law imposes on everyone-the general purpose of compensation is to give a sum of money to the person wronged which,
as nearly as possible, will restore him to the position he would be
in if the wrong had not been committed. In the case of a breach of
contract, the goal of compensation is not the mere restoration to a
former position, as in tort, but the awarding of a sum which is
the equivalent of performance of the bargain-the attempt to place
the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been
fulfilled. This distinction finds frequent expression and application in the decisions, 3 but of course these wide generalizations are
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago.
Illinois.
'This article will form the basis of a chapter in a textbook on Damages.
to be published by the West Publishing Company.
'Among numberless decisions in which this principle has been employed
are: Miller v. Robertson, (1924) 266 U. S. 243, 257, 45 Sup. Ct. 73, 69 1..
Ed. 265 (interest allowed on unliquidated damages for breach of contract.
where necessary for fair compensation) ; Ed. S. Michelson, Inc. v. Nebraska
Tire & Rubber Co., (C.C.A. Mo. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 597 (denying recovery
for breach of warranty of goods where buyer re-sold at an advance) ; International Harv. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1919) 186 Iowa 86, 172
N. W. 471 (damages for burning of implements in hands of dealer limited
to cost of replacement, and do not extend to market value in the store);
J. B. Preston Co., Inc. v. Funkhouser, (1933) 261 N. Y. 140, 184 N. E. 737,
affirmed, (1933) 290 U. S. 163, 54 Sup. Ct. 134, 78 L. Ed. 125 (statute
giving interest on damages for breach of contract, though unliquidated. if
applied to causes of action arising before, is not unconstitutional since it
merely removes obstacle to full compensation). See Restatement, Contracts,
sec. 329, and Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages, sec. 1.
3Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1933) 65 F.
(2d) 1001 (automobile dealer's expenses of moving in hopes of retaining
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not adequate formulas for placing before juries the standards of
compensation, nor for testing and regulating the amount of damages to be given for wrongs and breaches of contract. Other principles have been developed, which serve as limitations upon the
extent of liability in these cases. Of these, the most constantly
used are the principle which in contract cases restricts the damages to those which were in the "contemplation" of the parties
when the contract was made, 4 and the other principle, finding its
chief employment in tort cases, which bars recovery for consequences not "proximately" caused by the defendant's conduct.
Both of these doctrines give effect to major policies governing the
larger outlines of risk, or liability, which the courts are willing to
impose for given conduct. The "contemplation" doctrine, while
not strictly to be classed as dealing with those more marginal questions of "damages" in the sense of questions of measuremenl of
amount of award, yet procedurally is usually brought into play
to aid in determining what elements of injury may be included in
the award, rather than in turning the whole case in favor of the
dealership, not recoverable for breach of terminable agency contract) ; Ed. S.
Michelson, Inc. v. Nebraska Tire & R. Co., (C.C.A. Mo. 1933) 63 F. (2d)
597; Kennedy v. Hudson, (1931) 224 Ala. 17, 138 So. 282 (in contract
action against innocent indorser of forged note and mortgage, measure of
damage is amount paid by indorsee with interest from (late of paymentconfused discussion of basis of compensation) ; The Frederick Rapp Co. v.
Murphy, (1929) 110 Conn. 235, 242, 147 Ad. 709 (statement of basis of
compensation in contract) ; Genslinger v. Illinois Athletic Club, (1930) 339
Ill. 426, 443, 171 N. E. 514 (tort action for destruction of plaintiff's contract
right to control club memberships; damages are value of right at time of
destruction, not the full price of the memberships, which might not actually
be sold) ; Olive Hill Limestone Co. v. Gay-Coleman Const. Co.. (1932) 244
Ky. 822, 51 S. W. (2d) 465 (damages for failure to deliver to highway
contractor limestone at the agreed quantity per (lay; approving instruction
authorizing difference between actual cost of laying stone and cost if delivered
as agreed) ; Cragin v. Jones, (1933) 283 Mass. 474. 186 N. E. 578 (where
plaintiff in same position as if defendant broker, obligated to keel) marginal
stock on hand to answer demands, had kept his contract, no damages beyond
nominal) ; Security Store & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Railway Express Co., (1932)
227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S. W. (2d) 572 (for failure to transport stove in time
to be exhibited at show, plaintiff recovers expenses of shipment, rendered
futile by delay, notwithstanding general rule that plaintiff in suing oil contract gets only what he would have had if contract had been performed);
Smith v. Pallay, (1929) 130 Or. 282, 279 Pac. 279 (plaintiff, lawyer, sues
on agreement to employ him as ranch manager for one year, wrongfully
terminated; held, he recovers value of what he would have received under
contract during remainder of year. but not in addition for the loss of his law
practice, a loss which he would have suffered if the contract had been performed) ; Purdy v. Massey. (1932) 306 Pa. St. 288, 159 At. 545 (measure
of damages for bond given to mortgage-holder for completion of building is
cost of constructing the building). Dec. & Curr. Dig.. Damages. sec. 117:
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 329.
4
See par. 2, infra.
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plaintiff or the defendant, and consequently has been classified
in the digests and in the minds of lawyers under the heading of
"damages."
2. The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. The modern rules governing the measure of damages, both in tort and contract cases,
are the outgrowth of a widened control by the judge over the jury.
Before the eighteenth century, the jury, by and large, had a free
discretion when money damages were claimed to determine the
amount of the award.5 When the judges began to subject this
power to their control, by rulings upon evidence, and by the granting of new trials for excessive or inadequate awards, and finally
by advising and then instructing them on the matter of amount,
this control called for, and found, expression in rules and doctrines.
Still, the idea of a free discretion in the jury to fix the amount of
damages lingered and yielded slowly (and never entirely) to the
oncoming encroachment of these rules successively formulated in
particular kinds of contract cases. Such rules, for special kinds
of contractual transactions, were the rule which limited the damages for non-payment of a debt to interest and then only when
the debt was evidenced by a bill of exchange,' and the highly restrictive rule of Flureau v. Thornhill,7 which curbed recovery
against one who contracted to convey land, but failed to make title,
to the bare expenses of the buyer, without any allowance for the
loss of the bargain. The rules of damages, moreover, in case of
the sale of goods, had, by the end of the eighteenth century, been
announced in practically their present form.s But no broad general principle had developed even down to the middle of the nineteenth century, by which the judges could justify keeping a firm
hand upon amounts awarded for breach of contract, so as to confine such awards within the risks which the judges would believe
to be in accord with the expectation of business men.9 Thus as
5
The successive steps by which the judges took supervision and developed a law of damages may be traced in Washington, Damages in Contract
at Common Law, (1931) 47 Law Q. Rev. 345, (1932) 48 Law Q. Rev. 90,

and in Beale, Cases on Damages, 3rd ed., ch. 1.
6

Gordon v. Swan, (1810) 12 East 419, 2 Camp. 429, n.; see Washington,

Damages in Contract at Common Law, (1932) 48 Law Q. Rev. 90, 93,
et seq., for an account of the emergence of these rules, and of the background
of Hadley v. Baxendale.
7(1776) 2 Wm. B!. 1078.
sWashington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, (1932) 48 Law
Q. Rev. 90, 96.
9In this the English law was more backward than the French. which had
long since recognized that damages in contract against one who acts in good
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late as 1853, the English Court of Exchequer, in dealing with a
case in which damages were sought for failure to carry-out a contract to complete certain machinery at a time set, and a claim was
made for the loss of profits upon a transaction in which the plaintiff had planned to use the machinery, could lay down no more
restrictive standard than this: "The jury are not bound to adopt
any specific contract that may have been made; but if reasonable
evidence is given that the amount of profit would have been made
as claimed, the damages may be assessed accordingly."'" In short,
apart from a few special rules for particular kinds of agreements,
and some expressions to the effect that the damages must be the
"natural" or "necessary" result of the breach," one who failed
to carry out his contract was, so far as legal theory went, liable
for any and all resulting loss sustained by the other party, however unforeseeable such loss may have been.
However, in the next year, 1854, the same court, through the
same judge, handed down an opinion in the land-mark case of
Hadley v. Baendale,l2 which ever since has furnished the general
standard by which English-speaking courts all over the world have
tested claims for damages for breach of contract. This case was
one brought by the owners of a steam grist-mill against a carrier
for delay in delivering a shipment. The shipment consisted of the
broken pieces of the shaft of the grist-mill, which was stopped to
await a new shaft. The old shaft was sent to serve as a model for
a new one, and the carrier was told when the shipment was made
that the mill was stopped and that the shaft must be sent imnnediately, but he was not told that the stoppage of the mill was solely
faith must be limited to the foreseeable risk. See Pothier, Obl., pt. 1,c. 2,
art. III, secs. 159-172. The Code Napoleon (1804) includes clearly the idea
adopted in Hadley v. Baxendale, in the following passage: [Civ. C., Book
III, title I1, par. 1150] "A debtor is only liable for the damages [and
interest] which have been foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the
time of the contract, when it is not owing to fraud on his part that the
obligation is not fulfilled." (See French Civil Code, Rev. Ed., 1930, transl.
by H. Cachard.) The judges in Hadley v. Baxendale were aware of the
French rule and clearly were influenced by it. See. F. E. Smith (L.ord
Birkenhead), The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, (1900) 16 Law. Q. Rev. 275,
278; Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, (1932) 48 L.aw
Q. Rev. 90, 103. See also, 8 R. C. L. 455; Grindle v. Eastern Express Co.,
(1877)0 67 Me. 317, 24 Am. Rep. 31.
1 Alderson. B., in Waters v. Towers, (1853) 8 Exch. 401, 22 L. J. Ex.
186, 187, quoted, Washington, Damages in Contract Law at Common Law,
(1932) 48 Law Q. Rev. 90, 102.
lBoorman v. Nash, (1829) 9 B. & C. 145, 152, Dan. & LI. 269; Walton
v. Fothergill, (1835) 7 C. & P. 392.
12(1854) 9 Exch. 341, 23 L. J. Ex. 179, 23 L. T. 0. S.69.
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on account of the broken shaft, nor that no other shaft was available. The plaintiff claimed, as damages for delay, the loss due to
the enforced idleness of the mill, and the jury allowed the claim
In holding that the trial judge should have directed the jury that
this claim for "special damage" was not allowable, Alderson, B.,
formulated the long-needed principle of control, in these words:
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract,
as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to
both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach
of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at
the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation
the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great
multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from
such a breach of contract."
The court held that the notice given was not sufficient to
apprise the carrier that the delay would cause the mill to remain
idle, though it would seem that this inference was at least sufficiently debatable on the facts to be left to the jury, if the jury had
any function to play in applying the standard.
The significance of the case lies not in the dictum that if notice
is given liability will attach,13 for, as we have seen, unlimited liability had previously been the general standard. The history-making influence of the case lies in the decision that liability will not
attach for damage which was not "in the contemplation" of the
parties "at the time they made the cmitract." It lays down a general standard of foreseeability of damage as of the time of the bargain, by which judges can prevent or overturn the allowance by
13 Compare, however, the views of the learned writers in 3 \Villiston,
Contracts, sec. 1356 ("an extension of the rule governing consequential
damages") and 1 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., sec. 147 a ("no new rule has
been introduced"). It is submitted that these interpretations can no longer
stand, since the instant case has been set against its background by .Mr.
Washington, in his article cited above.
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juries of claims which would saddle on the defendant losses
thought by the judges to be unjust or disproportionate. This
standard is in the main an objective one. It takes account of what
the defendant, who made the contract might then have foreseen
as a reasonable man, in the light of the facts known to him, and
4
does not confine the inquiry to what he actually did foresee.1 If
the loss claimed is unusual, then it becomes necessary to ascertain
whether the defaulting party was notified of the special circumstances, but if it is the usual consequence of breach of the class of
contracts to which this belongs, and particularly if the claim of
damages is based upon the regular formula for damage in like
cases; 5 then the actual contemplation of the parties becomes unimportant. 16 Losses of the unusual kind, not recoverable unless special notice has been given at the time of the contract, are termed
"consequential" or "special" damages. This distinction between
the usual and the unusual losses from breach of contract, with
respect to the necessity of notice, corresponds rather closely with
the distinction between "general" and "special" damages, in the
sense of those which need not, and those which must, be specially
claimed in the pleadings.'I
14When contracts are made, the parties usually- not always-count
confidently on performance, and have no expectation of breach. This has
often been pointed out, e.g., in Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.,
(1902) 190 U. S. 540, 543, 23 Sup. Ct. 754, 47 L. Ed. 1171; and in Daughtery
v. Am. Union Tel. Co., (1883) 75 Ala. 168, 176, 51 Am. Rep. 435.
15Such formulas are usually expressed in terms of value, such as the
formula which allows the seller to recover the difference between the contract
price and the market value when the buyer refuses to accept, or the formula
which gives usable value or rental value for chattels or land detained, or the
formula which allows the value of the use of money, i.e., interest, for delay
in payment.
16This is strikingly illustrated by Cory v. Thames Iron Works and
Shipbuilding Co., (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 181, 37 L. J. Q. B. 68. In that case
the defendants breached their contract by delay in delivering the hull of a
boom derrick to the plaintiffs, dealers in coal. When the contract was made,
the defendants supposed that the plaintiffs intended to use it in the ordinary
way as a coal store. But in fact the plaintiffs intended a novel use, in transshipping coal from colliers to barges. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
the loss of the value of the use of the hull in the ordinary way, and the
damages were limited to that amount although the actual loss from inability
to use it as actually intended was greater. Compare, however, Martinac v.
Bakovic, (1930) 158 Wash. 193, 290 Pac. 847. There the plaintiff sued for
damages due to defendant's delay in delivering a fishing vessel built for the
plaintiff, and in his claim for damages mentioned only the loss incident to
the plaintiff's contract to use the boat in the employ of a certain fisheries
company. The proof showed that the latter contract was shown to the
defendant when he agreed to build the boat. The court held that the plaintiff
could not recover the loss of the reasonable charter or rental value of the
boat during the delay, but must recover, if at all, only damages sustained
under7 the fishing contract.
1 For use of the terms in the present connection, see Ruggles v. Buffalo
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While it has occasionally been criticized, 8 the acceptance in
this country of the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale has been wellnigh universal by the courts,' 9 and it has found a place in some
of the codes.20 Its effect, by subjecting all contract claims to a
Foundry Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 234; Adams Express Co.
v. Allen, (1919) 125 Va. 530, 100 S. E. 473; Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages,
sec. 5.8
1 Daughtery v. Am. Union Tel. Co., (1883) 75 Ala. 168, 176, 51 Am.
Rep. 435 (criticizing the "contemplation of the parties" as a fiction) ; Bergquist v. Kreidler, (1924) 158 IIinn. 127, 196 N. W. 964 (dictum of Mr. J.
Stone, suggesting that the rule of causation used in tort cases should suffice
to determine the allowability of damages in contract: the dictum ignores the
evident purpose of the rule, to enable the judges to limit the liability for
unknown risks, of one who enters a contract). See note, by J. G. Erde, in
(1926)9 11 Cornell L Quar. 540; 17 C. J. 744, note.
1 See the cases cited in subsequent notes to this section. The American
Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts, incorporates the rule in sec. 330, as
follows: "Foreseeability of Harm as a Requisite for Recovery.-In awarding
damages, compensation is given for only those injuries that the defendant
had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract
was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual course of
events, there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it
must be shown specifically that the defendant had reason to know the facts
and to
2 foresee the injury."
OE.g., Georgia, Ann. Civ. Code, (Parks

1914)

sec. 4395, "Damages

recoverable for a breach of contract are such as arise naturally and according
to the usual course of things from such breach, and such as the parties contemplated, when the contract was made, as the probable result of its breach.
In Louisiana. the provisions of the Code Napoleon (Book III, tit. III, arts.
1149-51, see n. 9, supra) have been substantially reenacted as follows:
"Art. 1934. Where the object of the contract is any thing but the payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount
of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been deprived,
under the following exceptions and modifications.
"1. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is
liable only for such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be
supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the contract. By bad faith in this and the next rule, is not meant the mere
breach of faith in not complying with the contract, but a designed breach of
it from some motive of interest or ill will.
"2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or
bad faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or
might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to such
as are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach of that contract;
but even when there is fraud, the damages can not exceed this." Louisiana,
Rev. Civ. Code, (Saunders-Marr) 1920.
The Draft Civil Code of David Dudley Field seems to have embodied
the Hadley v. Baxendale doctrine in modified form, as follows: "Sec. 1840.
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount
which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately
caused thereby, of which the party at fault had notice, at the time of entering
into the contract, or at any time before the breach, and while it was in his
power to perform the contract upon his part, would be likely to result from
such breach, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to
result therefrom." In this form it was enacted in California as sec. 3300 of
the Civil Code of 1872. By an amendment to this section in 1874, however,
the italicized clauses were stricken out, leaving the remainder unchanged, and
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test of foreseeability by the contract-breaker of the loss at the
time of the making of the contract, diminishes the risk of business
enterprise, and the result harmonized well with the free-trade economic philosophy of the Victorian era during which our law of
contracts became systematized. There has been but little variation
of the original phraseology in the use of the principle by American
courts, whose opinions still repeat the formula that damages are
limited to the "natural and probable consequences" 21 and those
which in the light of the facts of which they had knowledge were
"in the contemplation" of the parties. 22 The same idea is occasionally expressed more simply and directly by stating that damages may be given only for those consequences of the breach which
were "reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was entered
into as probable if the contract were broken."

213

so it now stands in California (Civil Code (Deering 1931), sec. 3300 and
annotations) and in the states which have copied the California Code (see,
e.g., Oklahoma, Stats. 1931, sec. 9963). Nevertheless, though the amendment
might have seemed to be intended to abrogate it, the Hadley v. Baxendale
rule is still read into the amended section. Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo
Water Co., (1906) 150 Cal. 51, 87 Pac. 1093, 7 L. R. A. (N.S.) 913.
21Caldwell v. Guardian Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d)
218; Tampa Term. Co. v. Richards, (1933) 108 Fla. 516, 146 So. 591 (quoting Restatement, Contracts, sec. 330); Bremhorst v. Phillips Coal Co.,
(1927) 202 Iowa 1251, 211 N. W. 898; and numerous cases collected in
Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages, sec. 22; 17 C. J. 742, (Damages, sec. 76).
2-Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., (1903) 190 U. S. 540, 544,
23 Sup. Ct. 754, 47 L. Ed. 1171 ("a person can only be held for such consequences as may be reasonably supposed to be in the contemplation of the
parties at the time of making the contract") ; Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v.
Masterson, (C.C.A. Tex. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 481 (where defendant agrees to
drill test oil well but fails, plaintiff owning lease on adjoining land cannot
recover cost of drilling a well on his land-not in "contemplation") ; W. B.
Davis & Son v. Ruple, (1930) 222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772 (damages for assault
by defendant's superintendent cannot be recovered in action on contract for
wrongful discharge) ; Olive Hill Limestone Co. v. Gay-Coleman Const. Co.,
(1932) 244 Ky. 822, 51 S. W. (2d) 465 (allowing recovery for special
damages of highway contractor resulting from defendant's delay in furnishing
stone, defendant having made its contract with knowledge of plaintiff's
contract to build road) ; Greavy v. McCormick, (1930) 273 Mass. 250, 173
N. E. 411 (action by landlord against prospective tenant who breached
contract to take lease; damage consisting of expenditures to make premises
ready, and loss of rent, held to have been in "contemplation") ; Miholevich
v. Midwest Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (1933) 261 Mich. 495, 246 N. W. 202 (automobile insurance company fails to pay judgment against insured, who being
without means, was arrested under body execution; held recoverable, as
within "contemplation") ; Bonhard v. Gindin, (1928) 104 N. J. L. 599, 142
At. 52 (repeating Hadley v. Baxendale formula in sustaining admission of
evidence of loss of profit on re-sale, in action by buyer against seller for
breach of contract of sale; but whether the defendant when contract was
made had notice of plaintiff's intention to re-sell does not appear) ; Smith v.
Pallay, (1929) 130 Or. 282, 279 Pac. 279 (repeating formula) ; Timmins v.
Williams Wood Prod. Corp., (1932) 164 S. C. 361, 162 S. E. 329 (for breach
of landlord's covenant to repair, damages for personal injury to plaintiff,
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3. Applications of the Doctrine. Among the most frequent
occasions for the application of the rule which denies recovery for
unusual consequences of a breach of contract, where knowledge
of the risk is not brought home to the defendant as of the time
the contract was made, are cases where the buyer of goods sues
for the seller's failure to deliver or for delay in delivering, or for
breach of warranty of quality, and claims damages for the loss of
profits upon prospective re-sales. Similarly, in actions by purchasers under contracts for the sale of land, against the vendor for
failure to convey, the same doctrine is often used to limit recovery
for loss of profits or other consequential damages. Again, in the
growing class of actions brought by prospective borrowers against
banks and others, for breach of contracts to lend money, the earlier
tendency of the courts to deny liability altogether except for the
increased interest paid upon securing the loan elsewhere has been
generally modified to allow recovery for consequential damages,
and the courts now rely upon a rather strict insistence upon the
requirement that the hazard must have been "in contemplation"
when the contract was made, to keep within bounds the risk imposed upon financial institutions by this contingent liability.2
child of tenant, not "within contemplation," and hence not recoverable in
action on contract); McGuire v. Osage Oil Corp., (Tex. Comm. App., 1932)
55 S. W. (2d) 535 (breich by oil company of contract to compensate driller
by assigning oil-lease, driller cannot recover expense of maintaining oil-rig
on location, during defendant's delay necessitated by his contract with third
in "contemplation").
person-not
23
Eastern Adv. Co. v. Shapiro, (1928) 263 Mass. 228, 161 N. E. 240
(where defendant fails to take advertising space on bill-boards, plaintiff can
recover expense of putting "fillers" on boards, in addition to contract-price).
24
The "usual" or normal damage is the difference between what the
plaintiff would have had to pay in interest and expenses under the contract,
and the interest paid and usual expenses for a corresponding loan elsewhere.
Hixon v. First Nat'l Bank, (1924) 198 Iowa 942, 200 N. W. 710; FarabeeTreadwell Co. v. Union and Planters' Bank, (1916) 135 Tenn. 208, 186
S. W. 92; gulp v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., (1923) 124 Wash. 326, 214
Pac. 145, (1923) 127 Wash. 249, 220 Pac. 766 (expenses) ; cases cited 36
A. L. R. 1411. To recover this no notice is necessary, but for recovery of
other losses, including unusual expenses and lost profits, the defendant must
have known of the risk when the contract was made, and this is usually the
pivotal controversy in these cases. See, in general, Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages, sec. 125, 17 C. J. 865; annotation 36 A. L R. 1408, 1413, 3 Williston.
Contracts, sec. 1411. Examples of cases where this requirement was held
to be satisfied: Western v. Olathe State Bank, (1925) 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac.
689, 44 A. L. R. 1484 (bank breaks contract, made in contemplation of trip
by plaintiff, to honor plaintiff's checks; plaintiff recovers expense of ruined
trip and for humiliation) ; Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank,
(1916) 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S. W. 92 (loss on forced sale of grain contracted
for by plaintiff) ; F.-B. Collins Inv. Co. v. Sallas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
260 S. W. 261 (loss of equity in property, by foreclosure) ; Larson v. Union
Inv. Co., (1932) 168 Wash. 5, 10 P. (2d) 557 (expenses of securing another
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Among the reasons given by the courts for the rule which restricts the liability of one who makes a contract to the losses which
he could then foresee is the suggestion that he is entitled to notice
of any special risk, before the agreement is closed, so that he may
modify his terms or withdraw if the risk seems too burdensome."
Consequently, it might seem that if this is the foundation for the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, it would have no application to the
liability of such public utilities as railway carriers and telegraph
companies, which are bound to serve all who come at uniform rates
for like services, and who, consequently, cannot withdraw or
20
modify their terms, when apprised of special danger of loss.
loan, but compare Avalon Construction Corporation v. Kirch Holding Co.,
(1931) 256 N. Y. 137, 175 N. E. 651, comment (1931) 18 Va. L. Rev. 76) ;
Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Sims, (1922) 122 Wash. 106, 209 Pac. 1113,
comment (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 499 (loss from insolvency of corporation,
forced out of business by defendant's breach of promise to make advances
to it). Cases where the requirement was not satisfied: McMillain Lumber
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, (1927) 215 Ala. 379, 110 So. 603 (lost profits of
saw-mill shut down because of failure to get promised loan, not recoverable
because no proof that promisor knew when contract made that borrower
would be unable to get money elsewhere-a truly exigent requirement; Nat'l
Bank of Cleburne v. M. M. Pittman Roller Mill, (Tex. Comm. App. 1924)
265 S. W. 1024, 36 A. L. R. 1405 (bank agrees to make advances to milling
company for buying wheat for use in mill; for breach company cannot
recover re-sale profits that could have been made on wheat that would have
been bought, use of wheat and not re-sale having been in contemplation when
contract made).
Where the contract is not for a loan, but for the financing of an enterprise in which the person making the advance is to have a share, the courts
seem to apply the same principles but with less strictness. Newby v. Atlantic
Coast Realty Co., (1920) 180 N. C. 73, 103 S. E. 908 (measure for failure
to furnish money for buying land under option is difference between optionprice and reasonable re-sale price) ; Stern v. Premier Shirt Corp., (1932)
260 N. Y. 201, 183 N. E. 363 (for breach of contract to finance new corporation, of which one-half the stock was to be held by defendants, causing
corporation to go out of business after two months, lost profits recoverable).
Where the contract to lend is breached, consequential injury is not recoverable, unless plaintiff shows that he was unable to procure the money elsewhere. Lowe v. Turpie, (1896) 147 Ind. 652, 44 N. E. 25, 37 L. R. A. 233.
36 A. L. R. 1416. Quaere, whether the burden should not be upon the
defendant to show that the plaintiff could have avoided the loss?
25E.g., Alderson, B., in Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. 341, 355.
23 L. J. Ex. 179, 23 L. T. 0. S. 69, says: "For, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of
contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them."
2 Upon this argument somewhat opposite conclusions have been built:
(1) that as against common carriers no recovery at all for "consequential,"
i.e., unusual damage, should be allowed, regardless of notice. Horne v. Midland Ry. Co., (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 136, 42 L. J. C. P. 59 (dicta of
Kelly. C.B.), see comments of Lord Birkenhead (F. E. Smith), (1900) 16
Law Quar. Rev. 275, 283; (2) that in such cases liability should be extended.
by permitting notice of the special risk to be given after the making of the
contract, if given in time to enable the carrier to act upon the notice and by
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Nevertheless, Hadley v. Baxendale was itself a case against a carrier, and in fact it is in cases of claims for delay, damage, and
non-delivery of freight, and cases of delay and mistakes in transmission of telegraph messages that the doctrine has been used
with most frequent and telling effect as a ground of defense against
burdensome claims for "consequential" damage. The rule which
discriminates in favor of one customer of such a public servant and
against another customer paying the same rate, upon the basis of
the extent of the notice given to the railway or telegraph clerk
when the service was sought, is not entirely equitable, and limitations of liability contained in the bill of lading or message-form,
and applicable unless a higher rate is paid, are now controlling
in interstate commerce and in some of the states, and by their more
drastic restriction of liability serve to render the earlier rule almost
obsolete.
4. Notice of Special Circumstances; the Flex-ibility of the Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale. As we have seen, when the claim is
for damages of the usual or standardized kind,-"general" damages-no showing as to notice or contemplation is needed. If the
judge determines, however, that the loss for which danmages are
claimed is an unusual, or a "consequential" one, then the question
whether knowledge of the circumstances creating the likelihood
of the kind of loss which is claimed was brought home to the defendant before he signed or finally assented to the contract becomes the turning-point. Though the contract be a written one,
an oral notification is sufficient.27 Notice after the contract is
assented to, and hence after it is too late to withdraw, is ineffective, even though given before the person notified has broken the
contract and inflicted the harm.s It is said that notice may be
special precaution avoid the injury. Virginia-Carolina Peanut Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co., (1911) 155 N. C. 148, 152, 71 S. E. 71 (opinion of Hoke,
J.) ; Bourland v. Choctaw 0. & G. R. Co.. (1906) 99 Tex. 407. 90 S. W. 483.
3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1111, 122 Am. St. Rep. 647; Conn v. Tex. & N. 0. R.
Co., 27(Tex. Comm. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d) 1004.
Hanson & Parker Ltd. v. Wittenberg, (1910) 205 .Mass. 319, 328, 91
N. E. 383; Messmore v. N. Y. Shot & Lead Co., (1861) 40 N. Y. 422. See
Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., (1903) 190 U. S. 540, 544, 93 Sup.
Ct. 754,
28 47 L. Ed. 1171.
Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., (1903) 190 U. S. 540. 23 Sun.
Ct. 754,47 L. Ed. 1171; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Co., (1874) 60 N. Y. 487;
3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1357. But see n. 26 supra.
In'case of the ordinary contract to pay money owed on a debt (as distinguished from lending or advancing it) the rule remains that the only damages
are the interest given for the delay after maturity. See n. 6, supra. Beck v.
Wilbois, (1922) 194 Iowa 708, 190 N. W. 376; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec.
1410. Presumably, mere knowledge by the debtor, when the debt was con-
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expressed or implied,29 and that if the circumstances known to
the defendant fairly apprise him of the danger, information in
detail as to just what loss will result from a breach is not essential.2 0 When the court feels that a recovery for the particular
consequential loss is just and reasonable, the requirement of
"notice" and "contemplation" is given a liberal interpretation.
Thus, an express company which accepted a shipment of hog
cholera serum (described as such in the receipt) and whose agent
at the time was told that prompt forwarding was important was
held to have had sufficient notice to render it liable for the death
of a large number of hogs, owned by the consignee, from cholera,
due to unreasonable delay in delivering the serum, even though
there was no direct evidence that the express company's representatives knew that the consignee was a hog-raiser rather than a
dealer in serum. 31 Again, a telegraph company which contracted,
on consideration of large payments, to maintain a fire alarm
system in the plant of a packing company, connecting with a gong
in the engine room, which system actually failed to give due alarm
in the engine room on the occasion of a fire, resulting in a large
loss because of a failure of the engineer to supply extra-water
pressure, was not allowed to escape liability on the plea that there
was no evidence that it had been notified that such increase in
water-pressure would be necessary. The court dismissed the contracted, of probable hardship on the creditor if the debt should not be paid
would not make him liable for more than interest. Clarke v. Life & Cas. Ins.
Co., (1932) 245 Ky. 601, 53 S. W. (2d) 968, 84 A. L. R. 1421 (where policy
taken out by husband on life of wife, as a burial fund and purpose known to
company when policy issued, husband cannot recover damages for mental
inguish for company's failure to pay, though he had to beg and borrow
money to bury her). But if the agreement is to pay not to the promisee but
to a third person on his behalf a sum of money for a certain purpose (e.g.,
to take up commercial paper, to pay taxes, to discharge liens, or to relieve
sureties) then special damages may be given for the defeat of this purpose.
Dillon v. Lineker, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1920) 266 Fed. 688 (breach of a promise
to pay off mortgage on plaintiff's property, resulting in loss of property by
foreclosure); Miholevich v. Mid-West Mutual Auto Ins. Co., (1933) 261
Mich. 495, 246 N. W. 202, 86 A. L. R. 633 (liability insurance company
wilfully neglects to pay judgment against insured, damages allowed for his
imprisonment under body execution) ; Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages, sec. 125.
3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1410; 17 C. J. 863, see. 177. As to extent of
liability of telegraph companies for failure to transmit money, see Sharp v.
Western Union Tel. Co., (1932) 39 Ariz. 349, 6 P. (2d) 895, 80 A. L. R.
293, annotated.
29Raleigh Iron Works Co. v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., (1926) 192
N. C. 442, 135 S. E. 343 (machinist who, in repairing cottonseed oil-mill
machinery, caused side walls of presses to be warped, resulting in difficulties
and delays in extracting cake from boxes, held answerable for resulting loss,
since he knew of particular use to which machinery would be put).
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tention almost impatiently. 2 A similar attitude is manifested by
some courts in the telegraph cases, in holding that knowledge of
the fact that a message is of an urgent business nature, and some
notice of the kind of transaction involved, is sufficient to hold the
company for special loss due to delay in transmission, without any
notice as to the particulars of the transaction or of the danger from
33
delay
Nevertheless, this same doctrine of "notice" and "contenplation," without any change in the form of its statement, is frequently
used, when claims for special damage are asserted which the courts
believe cannot be justly allowed, as a ground for denial of the
claim though in fact the knowledge brought home to the defendant
of the special circumstances creating the risk is at least as extensive as in the cases mentioned above. Usually the deficiency
thus found in the establishment of the element of notice, in cases
where the defendant concededly had ample knowledge of the special
purpose of the contract, is the failure to show that the defendant
had knowledge that the plaintiff could not attain this purpose, and
avoid the special loss, by securing the same service which the
defendant has promised from other sources.34 Thus, in Hadley v.
Brxendale itself, the carrier was told of the use to which the
broken shaft was to be put and that the mill was shut down, but
it was held that this was not enough, since it was not told that
another shaft was not available! Again, decisions in cases where
damages are sought for special losses for breach of contract to
make a loan, where the special purpose of the loan was disclosed,
have turned on the borrower's failure to make known the fact that
if money were not forthcoming he would be unable to secure a
loan from other sources 3 -a pessimistic view of his own credit
30
United States Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Berry, (1933) 249 Ky. 610,
61 S.3 W. (2d) 293 (dictum).
'Adams Express Co. v. Allen, (1919) 125 Va. 530, 100 S. E. 473.
32
Missouri Dist. Telegraph Co. v. Morris & Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1917)
156 C. C. A. 179, 243 Fed. 481, 490, certiorari denied, (1917) 245 .U. S. 651,
38 Sup
Ct. 11, 62 L. Ed. 531.
33
Davenport v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1932) 91 Mont. 570, 9 P.
(2d) 3 172.
'Even the person who contracts for the service will often not know
what the situation will be in regard to securing a like commodity elsewhere.
In fact, in making contracts, men seldom go further in conveying information
than to disclose their special needs and purposes.
35
Bixby-Theirson Lumber Co. v. Evans, (1911) 174 Ala. 577, 57 So. 39;
McMillain Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, (1927) 215 Ala. 379, 110 So.
602. Cf. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. O'Keefe, (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) 259 S. W. 222, 225, where an analogous question was involved, and
was left undecided.
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which a zealous aspirant for a loan could seldom be expected to
display. A signal instance of the use of the doctrine of notice in
this way is a recent New York decision,36 in an action for breach
of warranty of the quality of sugar sold under the defendant's
special "Federal" brand. Inferior sugar was delivered, but recovery by the buyer of the special loss incurred by him in paying
claims of his sub-vendees to whom he sold the sugar under an
identical warranty was denied, on the ground that while the seller
knew that the buyer might re-sell, he did not know that he would
re-sell under the "Federal" brand and hence would be unable to
substitute other sugar of the desired quality in supplying his subvendees.
These cases illustrate the flexibility of the doctrine of knowledge and contemplation, and this plastic principle generally proves
adequate, in the hands of skillful trial and appellate judges, to
prevent the recovery for breach of contract of damages beyond
the standardized range, whenever such recovery seems unjust or
unduly burdensome to business enterprise. The control is exerted
with the usual deference to the jury's functions in the trial. If
men could reasonably differ over the objective facts relative to
the giving of notice, or over the question whether on the facts
thus found the defaulter should, when the contract was made,
reasonably have foreseen that such a loss as this would be the
result of breach, then these questions of fact and inference are
to be submitted to the jury. 7 If either of these questions is so
clear to the mind of the judge that he believes a contrary view
would be unreasonable, the judge is to find the fact, or apply the
standard, himself.Y'
In determining whether to tighten or relax in a particular case
the curb upon the damages in contract cases, which they exert
through the flexible concepts of "notice" and "reasonable contem3Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Ref. Co., (1930) 255 N. Y.
33, 173
N. E. 913.
37
The statement in the text reflects the American practice. Holt Mfg.
Co. v. Thornton, (1902) 136 Cal. 232, 68 Pac. 708 (whether loss was in
"contemplation" held properly submitted to jury) ; American Bridge Co. of
N. Y. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., (1908) 32 Ky. L. Rep. 873, 107 S. W.
279, 284 (same) ; Shurtleff v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Assn., (1921) 105
Neb. 557, 181 N. W. 374 (reversed, for failure to submit this issue to jury) ;
Givens v. North Augusta Elec. Co., (1912) 91 S. C. 417, 74 S. E. 1067
(dictum) ; 17 C. J. 748, n. 8. But in one English case, Hadley v. Baxendale
has been interpreted as reserving the whole matter for the judge. McMahon
v. Field, (1881) 7 Q. B. Div. 591, 50 L. J. Q. B. 552, Beale, Cases on Damages 3 158 (opinion of Brett, L.J.).
8Givens v. North Augusta Elec. Co., (1912) 91 S. C. 417, 74 S. E. 1067.
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plation," it seems probable that two factors, of which the rule
itself takes no account, exert a deep influence. First, the proportion between the burden which would be imposed on the defendant
and the amount of compensation or gain which accrued to him
under the contract.3 9 Second, the degree of fault attaching to the
defendant. The French Civil Code40 clearly draws the line here, and
protects against unforeseen risks of the breach of contract only
one who has not acted in bad faith. Evidence that our courts
share the tendency to widen the liability of the deliberate contract-breaker, as distinguished from one who has by misfortune or
mistake failed to carry out his promise, is furnished by the instances where the courts in their opinions have called attention to
the willfulness of the defendant." In the view of the present
writer, this tendency is a wholesome one.
5. A further tightening of the Restriction upon Damnages inContract: the Rule that there must have been a Tacit Agreement
to assume the particudarRisk. In Hadley v. Baendale the judges
greatly narrowed the circle of the risk of liability imposed upon
the maker of a contract, by limiting it to the range of the risks
39
See Missouri Dist. Telegraph Co. v. Morris & Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1917) 156 C. C. A. 179, 243 Fed. 481, where the large compensation received
by the defendant was stressed, and see Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters'
Compress Co., (1904) 72 Ark. 275, 79 S. W. 1052, 1056 (compress company
recovered $5,450, for suspension of operation of plant, due to delay in repairs
to machinery, involving only $100 to $200 profit for repairer; reversed.
"Now, where the damages arise from special circumstances, and are so large
as to be out of proportion to the consideration agreed to be paid for the
services to be rendered under the contract, it raises a doubt at once as to
whether the party would have assented to such a liability, had it been called
to his attention at the making of the contract, unless the consideration to
be paid was also raised so as to correspond in some respect to the liability
assumed."). Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1867) 98 Mass. 232, 237,
93 Am. Dec. 157; McKinnon v. McEvan, (1882) 48 Mich. 106, 109, 11
N. W. 828, 42 Am. Dec. 458. In Campfield v. Sauer, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1911)
111 C. C. A. 14, 189 Fed. 576, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 837, the defendant's argument on the score of disproportion between his possible profit and the damages
sought
40 was said not to be "conclusive."
See the section of the code set out n. 9, supra. The same provision
survives in the Louisiana code, see n. 20, supra. It is applied in Lewis v.
Holmes, (1903) 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66, 61 L. R. A. 274.
4'Examples of such references are: Overstreet v. Merritt, (1921) 186
Cal. 494-, 200 Pac 11, 16; Hanson & Parker Ltd. v. Wittenberg, (1910) 205
Mass. 319, 328, 91 N. E. 383; Milholevich v. Mid-West Mutual Auto Ins.
Co., (1933) 261 Mich. 495, 246 N. W. 202, 203, 86 A. L R. 633. See also the
observations of Prof. Bauer to like effect, in Consequential Damages in Contract, (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 687, 699. Consideration in assessing
damages in contract cases of this factor of blameworthiness is, however,
disapproved in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., (1903) 190 U. S.
540, 547, 23 Sup. Ct. 754, 47 L. Ed. 1171; 2 Sedgvick. Damages, 9th ed.,
sec. 602; note, (1931) 41 Yale L. J.143; and see Dec. & Curr. Dig., Damages, sec. 57.
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known at the time of making to the party who later defaults. 2
As we have just seen, this circle may be narrowed still further on
occasion by a strict insistence upon complete knowledge of all
possible factors contributing to the risk.43 Despite this elasticity.
there have from time to time appeared decisions and dicta demanding a further curtailment of the field of liability in contract for
consequential damage. Instances occur where it seems to the
courts that a reasonable business man, under the circumstances,
might be entirely aware of the probability of heavy damage to
the other party in case of a breach, but would not understand or
anticipate that he would be answerable for such damage if he
should be unable to fulfill his undertaking. Often this is true in
cases where the risk arises from some entirely separate, or "collateral," engagement of the other party with third persons, and
where the hazard is so disproportionately heavy as not to be
adequately compefisated by the consideration received in the
present venture by the one upon whom the liability would fall.
Two English carrier cases raised the problem, not long after the
parent case. In the Nettleship Case, 44 a ship-owner had contracted
to carry from Glasgow to Canada with reasonable promptness
several cases of machinery intended, as the ship-owner knew, for
the erection by the shipper of a saw-mill at Vancouver Island. At
destination, it was found that one of the cases had been left behind.
Without this, which contained essential machinery, the mill could
not be erected. Was the ship-owner accountable for the delay in
the commencement of operation of the mill? Again, in 1Iorne v.
Midland Railway Company,4" a railway received, for shipment to
London, a large quantity of shoes, and was notified that the shipper had contracted to deliver them in London to another concern,
on February 3, 1871. In fact, though this was not communicated,
the shipper had sold them at an unusually high price to a jobber
who was buying them for the French army then fighting the
Germans. Was the railway, which delayed delivery until too late
to meet the sale, liable for the shipper's loss of profit? In each
case, the court denied liability for the "special" loss, and gave recovery only for the ordinary damage for the delay. In the latter
42See par. 2, supra pp. 499-504.
43See par. 4, supra pp. 507-511.
4"British Columbia and Vancouver's Island Spar, etc., Co. v. Nettleship,
(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 499, 37 L. J. C. P. 235.
45(1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 583, (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 42 L. J. C. P. 59,
5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 506.
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case, and possibly in both, this result could readily have been based
upon the insufficiency of the carrier's knowledge of the risk, but
in both cases a new restrictive formula was suggested. In the
language of Willes, J., in the earlier case:
"Though he [shipowner] knew from the shippers the use they
intended to make of the articles, it could not be contended that
the mere fact of knowledge without more would be a reason for
imposing upon him a greater degree of liability than would otherwise have been cast upon him. To my mind that leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the mere fact of knowledge cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the
party sought to b charged under such circumstances that he must
know that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that
he accepts the contract with the special'condition attached to it.
S.. Knowledge on the part of the carrier is only important if it
"46
forms part of the contract ...
This suggestion seems to have been carried little further in
England 4 7 but there has been a sprinkling of judicial approbation
of it in various American state courts,' 8 and it has been adopted
46(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 499, 508, 509, 37 L. J. C. P. 235.
47 See the discussion of the later decisions by F. E. Smith (Lord Birkenhead) in The Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, (1900) 16 Law Q. Rev. 275, 285.
A recent decision of The House of Lords recites approvingly the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, but makes no mention of the qualification suggested in
the later cases. Herbert Clayton and Jack Waller, Ltd. v. Oliver, [19301
A. C. 209, 220, 221, 99 L. J. K. B. 165 (actor sues for breach of contract of
producer to employ him in leading part; damages for loss of publicity approved
as within contemplation of parties).
- 8Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter, (1930) 181 Ark. 209, 25 S. W.
(2d) 448 (delay in putting through telephone call for broker; damages for
special loss on flour contract denied, though telephone employee knew nature
of plaintiff's business; "the facts and circumstances in proof must be such as
to make it reasonable for the judge or jury trying the case to believe that
the party at the time of the contract tacitly consented to be bound to more
than ordinary damages in case of default on his part." Snell v. Cottingham,
(1872) 72 Ill. 161, 170 (counterclaim against railway construction contractors
for delay in completing road; held, although contractors kn'w that delay
would entail large loss by owners of road through necessity of paying interest
upon a bond issue of $1,200,000, under the terms of the owners' contract with
the company to which the road had been leased, yet they are not liable for
this loss: "It is, no doubt, true, if the road had been completed by the 1st
day of January, 1872, appellants would have obtained a rebate of the interest
on the total amount of the construction bonds; but if it was intended to hold
appellees responsible in case of non-performance of their contract, according
to the terms of their private agreement with the lessee of the road, they
should have made it a part of the contract that the damages should be so
measured. Although appellees may have known there was such an agreement
between appellants and the lessee, they will not be presumed to have contracted with reference to any such mode of ascertaining the damages, and in
the absence of any special contract they are bound by no such rule. Had it
been known it was expected appellees would be held responsible for such
extraordinary damages, it is hardly probable they would have entered into
the contract, for the consequences of a failure for only a few days would be
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with trenchant emphasis by the federal Supreme Court in the
leading case of Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.4" This
was an action by a Kentucky buyer against a Texas seller, in the
federal court, for breach of a contract to sell, and to deliver into
the buyer's tankcars to be sent by the buyer to the seller's mill
in Texas, a quantity of cottonseed oil. The seller failed to deliver
the oil though the buyer sent cars as agreed. The damages claimed
were not only for the difference between the contract price and
the market value (the "normal" recovery) but also for the special
expense of fruitlessly sending the cars from Kentucky to Texas
and for the loss of use of the cars. These latter items were necessary to bring up the amount claimed to the minimum amount required to give jurisdiction to the federal court. The petition set
out the written contract which contained the provision that the
seller agreed to furnish cars, but there was no recital in the contract of danger of special loss in respect to sending the cars. The
petition did allege, however, that the defendant knezw when it made
the contract that such loss would be incurred. Nevertheless, such
special loss was held not recoverable on the face of the petition
by the trial judge, who consequently dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction. This was affirmed, and Holmes, J., for the court
said:
"But a man never can be absolutely certain of performing any
contract when the time of performance arrives, and, in many
most disastrous. The damages insisted upon, under this rule, exceed $44.000
-a sum enormously out of all proportion to the amount to be paid for the
entire work.") ; McKinnon v. McEwan, (1882) 48 Mich. 106, 109, 11 N. W.
828, 42 Am. Rep. 458 (denying damages for loss of profits for seller's delay
in delivering boilers for buyer's mill, although seller knew purpose of
boilers) ; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., (1875) 60 N. Y. 487,
494 (special damages for loss of re-sale profit allowed for seller's failure to
deliver caps for steel rails though seller did not know of price fixed in re-sale
contract; approving, however, the view "that a bare notice of special circumstances which might result from a breach of the contract, unless under such
circumstances as to imply that it formed the basis of the agreement, would
not be sufficient.") ; Lindley v. Richmond & Danville R. Co., (1883) 88 N. C.
547, 553 (delay by carrier of freight, consequential damages denied for want
of notice; dictum approving Horne v. Midland Railway Co., (1873 L. 1Z. 8
C. P. 131, 42 L. J. C. P. 59) ; Owens v. North American Elec. and Impr. Co.,
(1912) 91 S. C. 417, 74 S. E. 1067 (action for breach of contract to furnish
electricity for plaintiff's dairy; held, sufficient to allege knowledge of defendant when contract made, of risk of special damage, without alleging that
contract was made "with reference to such damages," but latter issue must
be submitted to jury if doubtful). Many of the earlier American decisions,
cited above, show the influence of Mayne's treatise on Damages, which
adopted the view that a tacit agreement was required. Wood's Mayne, Dainages, 50 (1st Am. ed.). See also the illuminating discussion by Prof. R. S.
Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 686.
49(1903) 190,U. S. 540, 23 Sup. Ct. 754, 47 L. Ed. 1171.
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cases, he obviously is taking the risk of an event which is wholly,

or to an appreciable extent, beyond his control. The extent of
liability in such cases is likely to be within his contemplation, and,
whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms which it
fairly may be presumed he would have assented to if they had
been presented to his mind. For instance, in the present case, the
defendant's mill and all of its oil might have been burned before
the time came for delivery. Such a misfortune would not have
been an excuse, although probably it would have prevented performance of the contract. If a contract is broken, the measure
of damages generally is the same, whatever the cause of the breach.
...It may be said with safety that mere notice to a seller of sonic
interest or probable action of the buyer is not enough necessarily
and as matter of law to charge the seller with special damage on
that account if he fails to deliver the goods."
The court held further that an allegation that the defendant
"maliciously" caused the plaintiff to send its tanks a thousand
miles, all the while intending a breach of its contract, did not
strengthen the claim for special damages.
While the opinion seems almost perverse in its anxiety to tiake
all intendments against the pleader in order to reach the doctrinal
point, and in its seeming indifference to the elements of wanton
bad faith on the one hand, and of severe hardship on the other,
which the pleader attempted to portray, it has naturally made a
deep impress upon later Federal decisions'o
50
1t has been applied to deny recovery for special losses, in Armstrong
Rubber Co. v. Griffiths, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 089 (counterclaim by buyer of tires, a retail dealer, for loss of good-will because of
defects in tires; held, knowledge by seller that tires were to be re-sold. not
sufficient to fix liability); Mfitsubishi Shoji Kaisha v. Davis, (D.C. N.Y.
1922) 291 Fed. 885 (action against carrier for non-delivery; carrier's knowledge that goods were for re-sale, insufficient); Stebbins v. Selig, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 230 (action for breach of contract to dig a well on
plaintiff's land, to irrigate rice farm; held, though defendant knew purpose,
not liable for loss of rice-crop, since parties did not contemplate that he
would be so liable when contract made). The two cases last cited hold that
the doctrine is one of "general law" as to which the local state decisions are
not controlling in the federal courts. Examples of federal decisions in which
the requirement of the Globe Refining Co. Case was held to be met: Stamford Extract Mfg. Co. v. Oakes Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d)
301 (buyer recovers damage due to seller's delay in delivering goods, causing
buyer to pay demurrage for vessel waiting for goods: "We agree that mere
notice of the extent of the promisee's loss is not conclusive; the loss must
be within the promisor's undertaking. That is no doubt a fictitious standard
to apply, for a contract is not a promise to perform or pay damages. Yet we
know of no test other than the loose one that the loss must be such that, had
the promisor been originally faced with its possibility, he would have assented
to its inclusion in what he must make good. It seems to us quite unreasonable to suppose that a seller in the plaintiff's position could have refused to
recognize, under these circumstances, that he was chargeable with so direct
a loss as this."-opinion by Learned Hand, Circ. J.) ; Fairbanks-Miorse & Co.

516

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

Nevertheless, the doctrine that there must have been an assumption of the special risk, express or implied from circumstances reaching further than mere knowledge, has been occasionally definitely rejected in state decisions," and usually the Hadl'y v,.
Baxendale formula of "notice" and 'contemplation" is recited as
the test, with no mention of the later innovation. The neatness
of a theory which makes compensation for breach of contract
depend in this instance upon the existence of a promise by the
defaulter to compensate-a promise, moreover, which concededly
need not conform to the usual rule in written contracts that all
terms must be embraced in the writing-has been assailed by an
eminent writer on contracts? - The "implied agreement" theory,
however, if properly ridden, need never carry the court to an
unjust result. It adds the fiction of a tacit promise to the original
fiction of "contemplation," and seldom is there anything in the
situation more definite and mandatory than the judge's sense of
justice to tell him to find the presence or absence of this silent
promise to assume the risk. 3 The recurrent cropping up of the
idea in the opinions of the courts indicates that some of the judges
have found the conception useful in giving expression to this
sense of the justice of the situation." If so, this serves as its
justification.
v. Austin, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 288 Fed. 1, 3 (loss of crops recoverable
for breach of contract for delivery of engine and pump for irrigation):

Shelley v. Eccles, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 283 Fed. 361 (land-owner recovers

for defendant's breach of contract to build and operate a beet-sugar factory.

damages for lack of enhancement in value of plaintiff's land. anticipated as
result of operation of factory).
511n McKibbin v. Pierce, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 190 S. W. 1149, the fact,
raised the issue with unusual neatness. A landlord sued a tenant for the
latter's failure to carry out an agreement to give up possession of the premises by a certain date, to make way for a new tenant, to whom the landlord
had agreed to pay $10 per day as liquidated damages, for delay in turning
over the premises. The evidence showed that the old tenant, before he made
the agreement to get out, was told of this liability of the landlord for $10
per day, and was told that the landlord would hold him responsible for this

if he did not get out. The reply was that he would "not get under" the
landlord's contract, but would "back up his own contract" to get out. The
old tenant was held responsible, nevertheless, for the landlord's loss under
the new lease contract, due to his inability to give possession. The court
said: "The law, if the party had the notice, impresses the rule, and the.parto

cannot exclude the rule by his mere statement that he will not be bound if
he continues in making the contract."
323 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1357. See also, I Sedgwick, Damage,.

9th ed., sec. 160. The American Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts, sec.
330. adopts the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, with no mention of the
(lualification
in the Globe Refining Company Case.
3
5See decisions cited in note 50, supra.
'"However useful the idea may be for inclusion in appellate opinions, it,

DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

A generalization wider than the formulas of "notice," "contemplation," and "implied agreement" has been suggested by Dean
Green, which probably describes the ends which the courts are
seeking better than these formulas do. He says:
"The formula is one for use in determining whether the interest involved is protected by the agreement. And it is not a
contemplation of consequences from a possible breach, but a contemplation of interests which may be protected by the contract.
Parties, in making contracts, rarely contemplate the losses which
would result from its breach. But they do count the advantages
they will gain from its performance. What initerests does the con-tract promote or serve? These are actually considered in most part,
and those which are shown to have been considered or reasonably
falling within the terms in view of the language used and the
background of the transaction, mark its boundaries-the limits of
protection under it." 5
The customary instructions to juries in these cases would more
closely focus upon the aim for which the rules were devised if they
were re-cast in terms of "interests intended to be served" rather
than of "losses which should reasonably have been contemplated,"
but "losses" are more familiar to jurors than "interests," so that
the traditional phraseology is more suited to the listeners.
In concluding the discussion of the successive steps in the
progress of our courts toward a satisfactory technique for limiting the damages for breach of contract so as to satisfy the desires
of the business man without unduly sacrificing the interests of
his customers, it seems fitting to hark back to a suggestion thrown
out earlier in the discussion.16 Would not our courts enhance the
realism of the rules and make them easier for juries to accept if
they gave formal approval to the tendency, written large upon the
actual results of the cases, to discriminate between the liability
for consequential damages of the wilful and deliberate contractbreaker on the one hand, and of the party who has failed to carry
out his bargain through inability or mischance ? Our rules should
sanction, as our actual practice probably does, the award of
value as a formula for use in the instructions at the trial is questionable.
It has been held, however, that the issue whether defendant has impliedly
agreed to be responsible for consequential losses should, if the evidence
raises doubt, be left to the jury. Lonergan v. Waldo, (1901) 179 Mass. 135.
60 N. E. 479, 88 Am. St. Rep. 365. But it may well be assumed in most
cases that if the issue of "contemplation" is explained and submitted, the
further embroidery of "implied agreement" will be apt to mean nothing t"
the jury, or too much.
55Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 51.
5c'See par. [4]. supra, notes 40. 41.
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consequential damages against one who deliberately and wantonly
breaks faith, regardless of the foreseeability of the loss when the
contract was made. We shall then have completed the process,
begun piece-meal in Hadley v. Baxendale, of borrowing from the
French Civil Code its theory of damages in contract.

